Snowsuits and Headscarves

A free, throw-away commuter newspaper made its debut in Istanbul during the past week and its timing could not have been more auspicious. As far as this observer is aware, the paper's debut has coincided with an event that has not occurred since the Czarist Russian offensive through the Caucasus during WWI - the last time Turkish soldiers were thrown into a mountainous winter campaign beyond the borders of Anatolia. Turkish military sceptics, including this observer, were generally surprised to learn that the military had chosen to undertake a winter operation in light of the added level of difficulty. The Turkish media has accordingly taken great pains to capture the exploits of the military's adventure into snowy northern Iraq. Photos of Turkish soldiers wearing white snowsuits have been the highlight of the media's coverage partly to emphasize the operation's degree of daring and surprise, but also due to the simple fact that the Turkish military has not allowed sufficient media access for the creation of alternative images.

The winter surprise attack on PKK positions in the Qandil Mountains region in northern Iraq has thus far yielded two main story lines in the international media and in the Turkish media to a lesser extent. First, there appears to be a general level confusion concerning what the Turkish military has actually accomplished. While body counts of dead "terrorists" as well as Turkish "martyrs" are provided in order to give the public a sense of progress, there does not exist a single source beyond the Turkish military's website or a press conference with General Büyükanıt to corroborate or qualify such statistics. (What delicious irony that the Turkish military, the country's staunchest defender of secularism, has appropriated an Islamic term to describe its combat dead.)

In addition, there appears to be a second point of confusion surrounding the question of why the Turkish military has maintained such a media freeze over the operation. This is particularly bewildering in light of the military’s comments that the operation has specific objectives, which are supposed to be limited in duration. It is unclear what the military has to gain from this approach.

It is still quite likely that the Turkish military will reveal the scope of military achievements for its latest operation once Turkish forces begin to conduct their pullout. The military seems to have so far maintained the view that it is turning the winter elements to its advantage with the added help of the element of surprise. The snow will hamper the Turkish forces, but it will also impede PKK fighters from fleeing the scene of attack. However, this observer also wonders whether PKK forces have truly decided to sit around the camp fire holed up in the snowy Qandil mountains for an entire winter season, as opposed to settling at lower and warmer elevations for the winter while waiting for the Turkish military to venture out in the spring. Whatever is the case, the Turkish military will undoubtedly label its operation a success whenever the time comes to make such announcements.

Another point worthy of consideration is to question whether Turkey’s winter offensive was truly intended to have decisive military implications. Rather, it seems quite possible that it was conceived for sheer political convenience. This view comes to mind when one considers the dominant fashion statements plastered across the entire spectrum of the Turkish media over the last eight days - either soldiers in white snowsuits or female university students wearing headscarves.

Combat operations against the PKK have always functioned as a unifying mechanism in Turkish society. This is no more apparent than when viewing the constant footage on all national news broadcasts that depicts the official funeral ceremonies or the grieving families of the Turkish combat dead. Faced with the incredible degree of polarization that has resulted from their successful initiative to legalize headscarves for women attending Turkish universities, it seems logical for Erdoğan and Gül to have encouraged the military to trudge around in the snow for a few weeks. A winter operation would distract the public away from its social crisis since it would remind them that there exist more critical and immediate threats to the livelihoods of the Turkish people compared to the headscarf. Judging by the fact that combat operations have been constantly featured as the lead story on the evening news during the past week, their tactic seems to have worked.

Further Reading: "Minority Rules"

Meline Toumani's New York Times Sunday Magazine article, "Minority Rules", is simply phenomenal. Her account of the contemporary situation of Kurds in Turkey, which is based on an interview with Diyarbakır's former mayor, weaves together all of the most necessary threads to describe the current state of affairs.

Click here, or

nytimes.com/2008/02/17/magazine/17turkey-t.html?ref=magazine

Toward the conclusion of her article, Toumani admits to her Armenian heritage. Sadly, this will most likely result in her article being discredited and ridiculed by many circles in Turkey. Even more criticism will be aimed at her choice to feature Diyarbakır's mayor, whom Ankara sacked after Toumani first conducted her interview.

Turkey's Foreign Affairs Blitz

While of minor importance to most Turks in comparison to their national football team's efficient victory over a weak Bosnia-Herzegovina side and the team's resulting accession to the Euro 2008 tournament, this past week also featured the Turkish government culminating an impressive flurry of foreign affairs activity. Although the Turkish national team has little chance under its coach, Fatih Terim, whose arrogance shadows his remarkable flair for dramatic dress-shirt and jacket collars, the government's latest efforts will surely give Milli Takım fans something to talk about beyond their team's early exit from the European football championship tournament this summer.

Turkey's latest foreign affairs campaign began almost a month ago. Motivated by Turkey's highly theatrical bluff to invade northern Iraq, Ankara hosted a rather awkward summit with Iraq's Prime Minister Al Maliki. This visit was followed by King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia and his delegation of 11 planes. Erdoğan and Gül would then elegantly contrast the King's visit by hosting Israel's President Peres, in addition to Palestinian National Authority President Mahmoud Abbas. Other than the usual series of forced handshakes in front of photographers, Turkey announced that it would lead the development of the Erez Industrial Zone in order to promote foreign investment to a destitute region prone to terrorist activities.

The pace did not slow during this past week. Prime Minister Erdoğan inaugurated a gas pipeline between Turkey and Greece, a key component of the Nabucco pipeline project that transports Central Asian gas supplies to Central Europe. President Gül then participated in ground-breaking ceremonies for the new Baku-Tblisi-Kars railway, which has greater symbolic importance than practical potential due to the dilapidated nature the rail networks in all three countries. Turkey's efforts to pursue peace in Palestine were ultimately awarded with an invitation to the Annapolis Summit, which was a significant acknowledgment of Turkey's (otherwise weak) presence in Middle Eastern affairs.

In December, Turkish foreign minister Ali Babacan will visit Greece to strengthen ties and promote Turkey's candidacy for the EU.

The Turkish media has been bubbling with suggestions of Turkey's emergence as a regional hegemon. These sentiments are typified by an article by Fatih University academic, Gökhan Bacık:

Turkey seeks to take concrete actions in the Middle East to move regional politics from its current abstract content to a more practical and implemental level. This is also not surprising because Turkey has the ability and capacity to achieve this. The Erez Industrial Zone, which will be constructed under Turkey’s leadership in the West Bank, is exemplary...There is one simple fact behind Turkey’s ability to offer concrete options and opportunities: that Turkey is a historical actor that has many aspects in common with all the actors of the region. For this reason, its contribution to make the devised projects operational is vital. The operational opportunities of the other actors including the EU are limited.

There is no doubt that Turkey should be commended for its recent surge in foreign affairs activity related to the Middle East. The country must do a better job of defining its modern identity in foreign affairs and this past month has been beneficial to that end.

However, this observer suspects that the ultimate success of Turkey's efforts will be tied to the true motivations for its involvement. If Turkey seeks engagement in a front-page issue like Palestine to self-promote its status as the EU's future bridge between Europe and the Middle East, it is doubtful that they will accomplish anything of note. However, if Turkey believes that it is in its own self-interest to develop such involvement in Middle Eastern affairs, with or without EU membership, then success will be much more likely. It is quite possible that Ankara is genuinely interested in forging stronger relations with Israel as a strategic advantage for the future.

However, Turkey has been making a big push of late to secure public declarations of support for its EU candidacy from multiple EU members. It is consequently the opinion of this observer that Turkey's most recent efforts, and particularly those involving Palestine, are nothing more than an attempt to pursue newspaper headlines in order to influence the opinions of Brussels Eurocrats. Gül's plan to establish an economic zone in order to address the relationship between unemployment and terrorism seems particularly inane given Turkey's own domestic problems with terrorism. Perhaps Turkey would grab even more European headlines if it first solved the unemployment problem in its volatile southeastern region.

Playing Poker and the Turkish Economy

The following article from Business Week offers a good review of most of the main themes of the Turkish economy and its prospects in the event of a Turkish invasion of northern Iraq.

The article finishes on a positive note with a comment by the AKP appointed treasury minister and former Merrill Lynch economist, Mehmet Simsek. Simsek believes that the Turkish economy has become sufficiently strong to carry the economic burdens that will inevitably surface in the [unlikely] event Turkey were to invade northern Iraq. While this certainly makes good print for the Turkish electorate and foreign investors, this observer is skeptical that Turkey's economy is really as firmly situated as the treasury minister suggests.

It seems rather odd that the author of this Business Week article chooses to end with Simsek's comment given his tacit reference to the debilitating economic circle Turkey would enter if it were to invade Iraq. A Turkish invasion of Iraq would cause global oil prices to explode and the U.S. stock market would take a further dive as a result. In this scenario, the Turkish economy would likely be impacted in three main regards.

I.) A fall in the U.S. stock market would cause the lira to loose strength relative to the dollar as it always does when there is economic uncertainty in the U.S. The Turkish economy would therefore be forced to pay even more dearly for the higher oil prices for which the Turkish invasion was originally responsible.

II.) Higher oil prices would have to negatively affect the global economy at some point. While Turkish exports might become cheaper in an invasion scenario, there would most likely be fewer buyers for these products.

III.) Since when do foreign investors flock to countries at war? A "bumpy ride" would assume that the Turkish military could eventually destroy every last whimper of PKK support. The possibility of that happening is zero. Whereas the chance of bombs going off in Izmir in the aftermath of an invasion is tremendous. A war in the south-east would also discourage tourism and depress real estate values, which are largely supported by foreign investment. The country's deficit, which would be already exacerbated by higher oil costs, will also be widened by greater military spending.

Turkey's political leadership may pretend that their actual reason for delaying the Turkish invasion of northern Iraq was in order to extract concessions and greater support from the U.S. There is no doubt that the Turkish government has played a solid hand of poker with its string of ultimatums. However, it is the opinion of this observer that the country's leadership is privately aware that the economy cannot overcome a war and the effects of its aftermath. The economy has certainly come a long way in less than a decade, but it has not reached a point where its fundamentals are truly sound.

Economic Take: The Kurdish Issue

Traveling through the southeastern regions of Turkey can be a bittersweet experience. Not only is the region's geography breathtaking at times, but so is the hospitality and incredible warmth of its people. Unfortunately, the living standard of most of the region's ethnic-Kurdish population is tragically low. While the historic economic situation of this part of Turkey has never been as robust as in the country's littoral areas, the Turkish military's reaction to the Kurdish uprising during the early 1990s was responsible for considerable regression.

Turks are understandably frustrated when they discuss the conditions of their country's southeastern region. They point to the preponderance of Kurdish families with seven, eight or more children and question why they should have such large families if they do not possess the financial means for their support.

It is very possible that there exists a degree of irresponsibility or irrationality in the family planning logic of Kurds living in southeastern Turkey. However, during the travels of this observer through places like Diyarbakır, Van and Urfa, it was apparent that there also exists a statistical rationale for having so many children. More offspring, and boys in particular, increase the likelihood that one of those children will be able to financially support the family one day. For an economy in which there are very few 9am-5pm jobs offering pensions, the family unit becomes much more important. This contrasts with urban centers, where people can literally afford to be self-focused. The reality presented is of course not exclusive to Turkey. In fact, it is relevant to many other parts of the world, including in my own country.

The Turkish economist, Mustafa Sönmez, has recently added a great deal of refreshing perspective to these issues as they relate to Turkey. His report entitled, "Increased Poverty in the East and Southeast and Solutions: Peace", is reviewed in the following Today's Zaman article. The conclusions of Mr. Sönmez are not particularly earth-shattering. Nonetheless, they highlight the fact that activity and discussion in Turkey of economic development in the southeast has been relatively superficial to date.

Turks will frequently reference the Güneydoğu Anadolu Projesi (GAP), or Southeastern Anatolian Project, as proof of the country's genuine conviction to develop the region. Ideally, this grandiose public-works project will do just that by harnessing the regions (rapidly depleting) water resources through a series of hydroelectric dams and irrigation systems. However, the execution of the GAP project has been slow and it appears that its funding has not been consistently supported by the country's politicians. In addition, this observer wonders whether the Turkish government enjoys playing God with the water supplies of its southern neighbors more than helping its Kurdish citizens.

Traveling through the southeastern regions of Turkey can be a bittersweet experience. Not only is the region's geography breathtaking at times, but so is the hospitality and incredible warmth of its people. Unfortunately, the living standard of most of the region's ethnic-Kurdish population is tragically low. While the historic economic situation of this part of Turkey has never been as robust as in the country's littoral areas, the Turkish military's reaction to the Kurdish uprising during the early 1990s was responsible for considerable regression.

It is often noted that PKK activity in the region has slowed the project's rate of completion. While the PKK is often a legitimate scapegoat in Turkey, it is truly not a viable excuse for those citizens, who fear the tide of terrorism. As NATO peacekeepers in Afghanistan or US soldiers in Iraq can tell you, people of any ideology are less likely to start shooting if they have reliable electricity and running water.

Keeping up Appearances: Turkey, PKK and N. Iraq

The feverish media atmosphere generated by the potential Turkish invasion of northern Iraq is on its way to reaching almost Cuban Missile Crisis proportions. Even Prime Minister Erdoğan has chastised certain Turkish media outlets for the manner in which they have covered the events of the past week. Having sold a lot of newspapers due to the most recent deaths and abduction of many out-numbered Turkish conscripts, there is little doubt that this type of media coverage will continue to carry the legacy of William Randolph Hearst for at least another few weeks.

It is the ambition of this observer to approach the question of a possible Turkish assault on N. Iraq in a way that touches on a number of factors and possible scenarios, which will undoubtedly influence the decisions made in the very near future. In addition, two recently published pieces about the potential Turkish invasion by Abdul Rahman Al-Rashed, the general manager of Al-Arabiya television, and by Gareth Jenkins of the Jamestown Foundation offer a number of very compelling insights for consideration.

Military: Television images of green Turkish military trucks rolling towards the border and comments by the BBC that, "Turkey has deployed up to 100,000 soldiers, backed by tanks, fighter jets and helicopters, along the border" are somewhat meaningless; it is very seldom that the Turkish military is not massing at the border with Iraq. It is likely that this most recent heavy military buildup began at the end of spring 2007 and has been reported in the media to have escalated at different times in response to PKK activity. As the saga of Abdullah Ocalan's pursuit and ultimate capture demonstrates, the Turkish military has had success in the past with bullying its neighbors (in that case Syria) by projecting military strength on their borders.

Unless they are completely gripped by hubris, General Büyükanıt and friends must have learned something from the US military's haunting experience in Iraq and even the Israeli army's most recent foray into southern Lebanon. With these two events in mind, it appears highly unlikely that the Turkish military could deal an enduring tactical blow to a very evasive and malleable guerrilla foe like the PKK. At the very least, the PKK can go underground in order to fight another day.

Furthermore, prime minister Erdoğan must be very careful about the expectations he defines for any type of military venture. As George Bush has demonstrated over the course of his tumultuous tenure as president, the military expectations of the public can have serious political repercussions when deaths and casualties mount.

Northern Iraq, domestic: A significant percentage of Kurds have probably disassociated the PKK from the struggle for an independent Kurdistan. Nevertheless, the PKK still possesses a great historical legacy that includes funding-ties to governments and organizations, who traditionally oppose Turkey. Indeed, the PKK has been of great help to Iran and Syria in destabilizing Turkey and it is widely argued that the likes of Greece and Armenia have supported the PKK in the past. It is therefore little wonder that the relatively new Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) has never appeared to have the ability to dislodge a political dinosaur like the PKK.

While the KRG and others are probably more widely associated with the fight for an independent Kurdish state at this time, a Turkish invasion of northern Iraq would probably blur this distinction. The presence of Turkish troops on Iraqi soil would likely increase sympathy among Kurds for the PKK cause. Assuming the Iraqi government in Baghdad proves incapable of providing any support, which would most likely be the case due to their current level of frailty, the Kurds in N. Iraq would gain even more resolve to pursue their own state in order to better protect their interests.

Turkey, domestic: An invasion of Iraq would almost certainly cause a very sharp rise in PKK sympathies among the large numbers of economically marginalized Kurds living both in the east of Turkey as well as the larger numbers living in Turkey's western cities. This is a particularly scary thought if viewed in the context of the rising popularity of neo-fascist and nationalistic groups, which was most recently evidenced by the MHP gaining ground in the July parliamentary election. The AKP was a surprisingly popular choice of the Kurdish vote in July, and neither Erdoğan nor Gül would want to compromise this vote or give the country's right-wing any more reason to disrupt the social peace.

Conclusion: In the view of this observer, the numerous big-picture issues strongly rival the more widely-reported short-term political reasoning for a full-scale military assault in northern Iraq. An invasion would most likely further destabilize Iraq. It would furthermore cause social and political unrest within Turkey, which would not bode well for the political fortunes of the AKP. It is for this reason that such a large-scale invasion is quite unlikely. Like Gareth Jenkins, I believe it is much more realistic that there will be narrowly-focused commando raids and aerial strikes, if anything at all. This approach ultimately represents the safer political course for Turkey's political leadership.

Russian Whispers and the PKK

Turkey has been the unequivocal star of this week's news agenda. Turkish cable news has featured a mindless stream of images featuring mortars being fired into the anonymous distance, well-equipped commando units waiting at attention, and other staged military exercises involving men with big guns and intimidating face paint. While Erdoğan and Gül are bathing in the warm light of nationalist sentiment generated by the recent deaths of soldiers and policemen, as well as the Armenian genocide legislation, it is the opinion of this observer that the current media and diplomatic buildup will amount to nothing more than the usual sabre-rattling. It would be surprising if future military actions amounted to something more than limited raids and aerial assaults. Full-scale invasions are expensive propositions and Turkey doesn't exactly have the financial resources of the United States or even Russia.

On Wednesday, a spokesman for the Russian Foreign Ministry issued a comment that was rather surprising in light of his country's recent experience with full-scale invasions.

We urge all parties in the conflict to exercise maximum restraint and demonstrate the ability to assess the long-term effects of their actions, including those that might further aggravate the situation.

This comment seemed rather strange in light of the fact that Turkey's ordeal with the PKK is ultimately an issue of a minority ethnic group's will to politically separate. In many regards, Turkey's situation in northern Iraq and south-eastern Anatolia is analogous to Russia's debacle in Chechnya. Depending on one's point of point of view, the underdogs were either "freedom fighters" or "terrorists". Over the years, Russia has had its fingers burnt in a number of such blistering-hot pies ranging from Afghanistan to the northern Caucasus.

While there was some oil to be lost if Chechnya had successfully broken away, the main threat was the dismemberment of the very ethnically and regionally-complex puzzle that is the Russian Federation. This was especially a concern when Boris Yeltsin was proving rather incapable of running the show in Moscow. Vladimir Putin arguably reignited the disastrous campaign in Chechnya in order to rally the country around a single nationalist cause. Russian history is full of similar examples of the country's political leaders using the "foreign threat" to their political advantage. It would seem that Turkish politicians have often capitalized on the "PKK-threat" for this same purpose.

Clearly, Russia's voice concerning the PKK-issue is not as potent as it would be for an event related to Armenia or Central Asia. It is quite possible that Russia has already established certain economic ties with the Kurdish government in northern Iraq, which they do not want compromised. Vladimir Putin is apparently scheduled to visit Iran in the very near future. Hopefully, we will gain some greater clarity concerning this rather surprising statement at that time.

Fortress Turkey: Turkey - Iraq Security Wall

The Turkish newspaper Yeni Şafak, which is affiliated with the AK Parti, reported this week that the Turkish military plans to build a security fence that will span Turkey's border with northern Iraq. The planned fence, for which an anonymous source estimated a cost of $2.8 million, is meant to bolster Turkey's defenses against trans-border military activities sponsored by the PKK.

For additional information about the wall, please read the following article.

Throughout the spring and summer months of this year, the Turkish military has made much ado about a possible invasion of northern Iraq and most likely the Qandil region in particular. In terms of their rhetoric, Büyükanıt and the rest of the military have taken a page from the "Bush Doctrine", arguing that the best defense is a good offense.

The building of a great Turkish security wall would be appear to be inconsistent with this philosophy. While the Israelis have consistently proven that the military usage of a wall does not restrict a military from frequent proactive or offensive operations, Turkey's wall will protect a much longer and less dense swath of territory. This observer wonders whether such a long fence will truly offer greater protection against PKK incursions originating from northern Iraq? Will security cameras and possibly even infrared equipment really tip the scales in favor of the Turkish military? If the Turkish military can't stop the PKK in the current environment of fluid trans-border movement, it seems unreasonable to think that a (seemingly inexpensive) $2.8 million fence will make much difference from a military standpoint.

Time will tell whether such talk concerning the creation of "Fortress Turkey" will indicate a shift in the Turkish approach to the PKK nuisance in northern Iraq. Talk of a Turkey invading northern Iraq will probably continue in the future, but the creation of a wall will certainly change the Turkish psyche to a certain extent vis a vis the PKK .

Abdullah Gül's Upcoming Constitution Proposals: Looking at the Glass Half-Full

Now that the Turkish upper classes have returned from their sacred beach holidays and cool winds have at last prevailed on the torturous summer temperatures, Turkey watchers are settling in to observe what should prove to be a rather protracted debate. Turkey's man of the hour, Abdullah Gül, will drop his first bomb shell during the next few weeks. The country's secular elite is more than ready to sound the alarm while the ever enigmatic Turkish military bides its time in the shadows prepared to pounce at any moment.

The substance of this impending commotion will be directly related to Gül's plans to reform the Anayasa, which is Turkey's constitutional document. The spirit in which he plans on carrying out these reforms, as well as some of the particulars of his plan, has been neatly outlined an article from this weeks Economist.

Yet the 56-year-old former economist [Gül] hinted at a looser interpretation of Turkey's unique brand of secularism. Until now this has been defined by Ataturk's renunciation of Islamic symbols and rigid state control over all aspects of religious life. Secularism, said Mr Gul, was a precondition for “social peace” but also offered a model “for different lifestyles”. Some seized on his words as proof that he will support loosening restrictions on the headscarf and religious education.

As Mr Gul approved a new pro-EU cabinet this week, another clash loomed over a “civilian” constitution that Mr Erdogan proposes to adopt next year to replace the current text, written by the generals after their last coup in 1980. Draft clauses leaked to the media are nothing short of revolutionary: senior officers will no longer be immune from prosecution in civilian courts, military appeals courts will be scrapped, Kurdish will be taught as a second language in government schools and the definition of Turkishness will be expanded to embrace citizens from different backgrounds and creeds.

Almost all of the issues above strike at the heart of the national psyche and generally define the way any given Turkish citizen perceives their country. The idea of "social peace for different lifestyles" , whether they be ethnic or religious, is an extremely sensitive one. Particularly among pro-secular and prosperous segments of society, there exists a very strong conviction that there is a single secular, Turkish model by which all citizens of Turkey should abide. When the point is made that certain segments of the country's society, such as the Kurds, might have a different orientation toward "their country", a commonly heard refrain is that, "We are all Turkish people and there is no reason why we shouldn't live together in harmony."

From the perspective of this observer, the idea of Gül's initiative to achieve legal tolerance for other lifestyles is extremely attractive in theory. Particularly in the realms of education and freedom for cultural expression (including language), there are many segments of Turkey's population, which are explicitly denied the types of opportunities that one takes for granted in Western Europe. Indeed, one could argue that if these segments of the population, which exercise alternative lifestyles or cultures, were not the victims of a political agenda, they would cease to represent such debilitating political issues.

For example, less than a decade ago it was legally forbidden to speak the Kurdish language in public. Did not the easing of this restriction help relations between Turkey and its largest ethnic minority? Would not the continuation of this trend as proposed by Gül further augment the level of content felt by Turkey's Kurds?

Similarly, scholars have often wondered whether there is a correlation between the traditional campaign waged by the Turkish government against head scarves and the increasing numbers of Turkish women, who choose to wear head scarves as a political statement. Perhaps an easing on this issue would actually diminish the use of the head scarf as a political issue over the longer term.

These would all be positive developments if it is indeed the case that Abdullah Gül's true intention is to make Turkey a more tolerant of its multiple cultures or "lifestyles". However, it remains to be seen whether his real agenda is in fact religious in nature; a near-term goal to make Ataturk's secular nation more tolerant of other persuasions in order to fulfill a long-term goal of becoming the next Iran.

Whatever the intentions of Turkey's new president, it is the sincere hope of this observer that the Turkish military gives Gül the benefit of the doubt in the near-term at the very least. Anything short of such restraint by the military would make a further mockery of the institution of democracy in Turkey.